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Mission statement  
The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced 
research on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, 
from developing, implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on 
the wider economy and society. 
Rationale 
Migration represents both an opportunity and a challenge. While well-managed migration may foster 
progress and welfare in origin- as well as destination countries, its mismanagement may put social 
cohesion, security and national sovereignty at risk. Sound policy-making on migration and related 
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priorities. Because migration is rapidly evolving, knowledge thereof needs to be constantly updated. 
Given that migration links each individual country with the rest of the world, its study requires 
innovative cooperation between scholars around the world. 
The MPC conducts field as well as archival research, both of which are scientifically robust and 
policy-relevant, not only at European level, but also globally, targeting policy-makers as well as 
politicians. This research provides tools for addressing migration challenges, by: 1) producing policy-
oriented research on aspects of migration, asylum and mobility in Europe and in countries located 
along migration routes to Europe, that are regarded as priorities; 2) bridging research with action by 
providing policy-makers and other stakeholders with results required by evidence-based policy-
making, as well as necessary methodologies that address migration governance needs; 3) pooling 
scholars, experts, policy makers, and influential thinkers in order to identify problems, research their 
causes and consequences, and devise policy solutions. 
The MPC’s research includes a core programme and several projects, most of them co-financed by the 
European Union. 
Results of the above activities are made available for public consultation through the website of the 
project: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu 
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This paper will provide a statistical assessment of migration before and after the uprisings in the 
Southern Mediterranean. It will review European and Arab state policies regarding migration and will 
ultimately encourage the factoring of the outcomes of the Arab Spring within migration policies on 
both shores of the Mediterranean. The assessment is based upon the most recent statistical data 
gathered directly from the competent offices in European Member States; from policy documents 
emanating from the European Union and concerned States; and from first-hand accounts from surveys 
conducted in Spring 2012 by scholars in six Arab countries (within Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Jordan and Lebanon) in collaboration with the Migration Policy Centre (MPC).  
Notably, migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, apart from a short-lived 
movement from Tunisia, but has simply continued along previous trends. In sharp contrast, migration 
within the Southern Mediterranean has been deeply impacted by the events as outflows of migrants 
and refugees fled instability and violence in Libya and Syria.  
The Arab Spring already triggered two major refugee crises in the Neighbourhood of Europe, 
previously in Libya and currently in Syria. Out of more than one million which fled Libya, only 
25,000 reached Europe; and out of 100,000 who are fleeing Syria, perhaps only a few hundreds are 
today in Europe. While a Regional Protection Programme has been launched to safely accommodate 
refugees in the vicinity of their homelands in North Africa, no significant move towards a policy of 
resettlement in Europe has yet taken place. The bulk of the burden was supported by neighbouring 
Arab States and Turkey. Governments and international organizations also took their part, but 
remarkably civil society and local populations played the biggest role.  
European and Arab states have responded to these movements, both to Europe and within the 
region, in several ways. In the Arab States, the topic of migration was simply eclipsed by social and 
political movements in the media and public debate. However, several newly formed governments 
took initiatives to better incorporate their diasporas in, not only economic, but also political processes. 
The EU and its Member States viewed the monumental changes taking place in the Arab world as a 
unique political opportunity, not only for the Arab peoples, but also for the Mediterranean region and 
for Europe’s multifaceted links with these countries. In response, the EU expanded its focus on 
democracy promotion within the region.  
Although new emphasis was dedicated to democracy-building, the EU did not invent any new 
responses to migration drivers. Rather, EU policies on migration after the Arab Spring reaffirmed old 
positions regarding Mediterranean migration – in particular, controlling the external borders of 
Europe. Acknowledging the frustrations of the youth which partly brought about the Arab Spring, the 
EU has started to facilitate mobility by increasing slots available for university scholarships and 
exchanges in Erasmus Mundus, and by discussing Mobility Partnerships with Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt and Jordan. However, the partnership has been declined by Egypt, and other countries are so far 
unwilling or unable to accept such agreements as they presently stand.  
Currently, EU funding for countries in the Southern Mediterranean is based on a ‘more-for-more’ 
approach. The more a country democratically reforms, the more support they receive. EU Member 
States are also funding governments south of the Mediterranean through Arab States’ implementation 
of readmission agreements and through a Regional Protection Programme in North Africa. The EU 
and its Member States are keen to make sure that this funding is not diverted for repression of citizens. 
Given that newly forming regimes have never experienced managing nation-states, the promotion of 
democracy could become jeopardized if support for border control results in strengthening forces of 
repression thereby fomenting conditions for continued strife.  
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Introduction 
The Arab spring has already brought considerable changes and more is to come. Being triggered for 
the first time in recent Arab history by social movements, political changes, in the long-term, can be 
expected to produce overall effects on migration: on movements of people, on the perception of 
migration-related issues by opinions and states, and on policies in all migration-related matters. 
Change will certainly take place, but no one can predict which direction and magnitude it will have.  
If revolts end up with the establishment of regimes that are responsive to peoples’ demands and 
install trust, economically and politically, one can expect emigration to gradually slacken and even 
some return migration to take place. The opposite movement must be expected if revolts stall and fail 
to provide political freedoms and economic security. Moreover, it is impossible to anticipate how 
governments to be established will deal with migration-related issues.  
This paper will provide a statistical assessment of migration before and after the uprisings, and will 
review European and Arab state policies regarding migration in order to encourage the factoring of 
migration within European policies post-Arab Spring. Additionally, the paper will present first-hand 
accounts from the Migration Policy Centre’s (MPC)collaborative surveys on migration after the Arab 
Spring in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (although, at the time of writing, these 
surveys are not fully available).  
Migration from Arab States on the Eve of Uprisings 
Large scale emigration from Mediterranean Arab countries
1
 started four to five decades ago. When 
revolts broke out at the end of 2010, the region was source to almost 8 million first-generation 
migrants; 62% of them were living in an EU member state, 27% in another Arab state (20% in the 
Gulf) and 11% in another part of the world (Table 1). By world standards, most of these countries 
were above average senders of international migrants with first-generation emigrants representing 
between more than 2% of the total population in Syria and 12% in Lebanon, compared with a 3% 
world average. Libya, a major receiver of international migrants, was the only country with a small 
percentage of emigration (1% of its population).  
Strikingly, the period immediately preceding the revolts was one of intense emigration in most of 
these countries. From 2001 to 2010, their aggregate number of emigrants to the OECD countries 
increased by 42%, from 3.5 to almost 5 million (Fig. 1). In sharp contrast with the common idea that 
international migration has become globalised, the lion’s share of the increase in Arab emigration to 
OECD countries between 2001 and 2010 has been destined to Europe (91%; see Fig. 2) and 
particularly to the three closest neighbours of the Arab states: Spain, Italy and France (Fig. 3). In the 
first two countries, low- or mid-skilled migrants were attracted by jobs left vacant by natives in 
conjunction with booming economies and rapidly rising standards of living. In France, however, the 
oldest country of immigration to Europe, the recent increase in Arab immigration was mainly due to 
family reunification. 
 It must be noted that non-OECD countries, in particular the Gulf States and other Arab states, are 
not included in statistics on changes between 2001 and 2010. Several sources indicate that while 
strong policies of nationalisation of employment in the Gulf failed and the proportion of foreign-
nationals in the workforce dramatically increased between 2001 and 2010 in all Gulf States in spite of 
                                                     
1
This paper deals with the following countries, from West to East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, 
Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. 
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these policies, Arabs were largely outnumbered by Asians in recent migration flows to the Gulf (with 
the exception of Egyptians in Saudi Arabia).
2
 
Morocco was, at the same time, the largest and fastest growing sender of migrants to OECD 
countries with 1,447,486 migrants in 2001 and 2,341,093 migrants in 2010 (i.e. an increase of 62% in 
10 years). Although in smaller numbers, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and very significantly Libya 
also experienced a steady increase of their emigration to the OECD (Fig. 3). All of the above countries 
except Algeria were about to become the scene of massive uprisings in 2011. The same factors that 
had produced emigration –the frustration of young people faced with unemployment, low rewards to 
education, state authoritarianism and lack of fundamental freedoms—were now triggering protest. 
Did emigration play any role in the political and social movements that were to shake the Arab 
countries starting from 2011? If one regards emigration as an alternative to protest -- an ‘exit’ instead 
of ‘voice’ response to discontent and frustration, according to Albert Hirschman’s model3 -- then one 
must acknowledge that emigration did not bring the prosperity that would have reduced the economic 
roots of revolts. Indeed, on the one hand, flows of migrant workers were small in comparison with 
those of new entrants on the labour market and emigration hardly lessened the pressure exerted by 
unemployed and under-employed young people. And on the other hand, if remittances certainly 
enhanced the social status of migrants’ families, it remains doubtful whether they were able to fuel 
sustainable development in the origin country. Actually, there are no convincing success stories of 
emigration-based development at the national level in Arab countries.  
If migration was not a decisive agent of economic change, then did it contribute to political change 
and play a role in the uprisings? Much emphasis has been put on iconic figures of migrants and exiles 
who returned to their country at the very beginning of the movement and played a key role in 
subsequent civil or political developments, from Egypt‘s blogger Wael Ghoneim to Tunisia’s 
President Moncef Marzouki. Moreover, models and values migrants have been exposed to in their 
destination country may have worked behind the scenes in shaping political opinions and ideologies, 
through a mechanism commonly described as social, or ideational, remittances. From this point of 
view, migrants’ destination probably matters. Schematically, one can speculate that migrants to Gulf 
States are potential vectors of dissemination of Wahhabi or Salafi models that prevail in the host 
society, while migrants to the West may convey secular values to their origin countries. For transfers 
to operate in the expected direction, however, migrants must be well integrated in the society of their 
destination country. Failed integration may act otherwise and produce the rejection of mainstream 
values and models of the host society.  
A Mediterranean region in which migration from the southern shore would preferentially go to 
Arab oil states and no longer head for the northern shore would be a dangerously bipolar region. 
Surveys in several Arab countries have recurrently evidenced young peoples’ dreams of having a 
migratory experience and their preference for the West over the Gulf, if opportunities are given to 
them.
4
 In the light of the Arab Spring and for the sake of the stability and shared prosperity sought for 
by Europe, migration should be regarded as the strongest bridge between the two contrasted shores of 
the Mediterranean.  
Long standing histories of emigration had led Arab Mediterranean countries to consider themselves 
as migrant-senders rather than receivers. However, viewed from the South and the East, these 
countries would appear before the uprisings as relatively rich and safe. They would attract migrants 
                                                     
2
 Fargues, P. (2011). Immigration without inclusion: non-nationals in nation-building in the gulf states, Asian and Pacific 
Migration Journal 20 (3-4): 273-292 
3
 Hirschman, A. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press 
4
 Eurostat. (2000) Push and pull factors of international migration – country report-egypt. Eurostat Working Papers, 
Population and social conditions 3/2000/E/n07. 
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and refugees from their African and Middle Eastern neighbours faced with dire under-development 
and/or torn by civil and military conflicts. However, because governments were not willing or simply 
not prepared to incorporate large numbers of foreign-nationals, irregularity grew in parallel with 
immigration. It was estimated on the eve of the uprisings that around 4.5 million first-generation, 
temporary or long-term, immigrants were living in the Arab Mediterranean countries, with two-thirds 
of them in irregular situation regarding stay or, more often, work (Table 2). 
Three different categories of immigrants were found in the region. Migrant workers were the 
largest group, including many workers in the informal sector who were not eligible for a work permit 
and were therefore in irregular situation. Refugees were the second largest group including a majority 
of de facto refugees, i.e. persons in need of protection according to criteria set by International 
Refugee Law but who could not, or would not wish to, be recognised as refugees in the country where 
they found shelter. The third and much smaller group is composed of transit migrants, i.e. persons 
initially bound for Europe but stuck at its external border for lack of entry visa.  
Libya was the largest migrant-receiver in the region. In conjunction with several economic 
downturns, linked to international sanctions or fluctuating oil prices, the number and status of migrants 
in Libya have always been unstable and punctuated by recurrent and sometimes massive deportations. 
Syria and Jordan would come next, with large yet indefinite numbers of Iraqi refugees hosted as 
temporary ‘guests’, meaning that they were not granted the status of refugees and, therefore, not 
protected and denied access to the labour market and basic services. Lebanon was also host to Iraqi 
refugees in smaller numbers, but above all to a sizeable workforce from Syria, often employed without 
a work permit. Egypt was host to migrants and refugees from Sudan and the Horn of Africa, many of 
them with no residence permits. Finally, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia had recently become 
significant receivers of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, composing a mixed population of 
undocumented workers, unrecognised refugees and transit migrants.  
Migrants, and particularly those in irregular situations who have often no choice but to hide and 
live in limbo, would become a population at risk when uprisings broke out. For lack of updates 
information, this paper will not bring all the attention this critical issue deserves.  
Migration movements from and to the Arab countries since the beginning of the 
uprisings  
Did social and political movements in the Arab countries produce an impact on structural, economic 
migration and would such an impact be observable one year and a half after they started? Regarding 
emigration, did the revolts result in increasing outflows from these countries, or on the contrary did 
they raise hopes of better governance and translate into some movement of return from the diasporas? 
Regarding immigration, did they lower the appeal of these countries of migrant workers, refugees and 
transit migrants? At the time of writing, statistical information on migration after the onset of the Arab 
spring is extremely scanty and does not allow for a full response to these questions. However, it gives 
clues that former trends simply continued.  
Only four EU countries provide annual statistics of (legal) immigrant stocks by country of 
nationality until 1 January 2012: Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. In all of them, 
migrant stocks from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria have been increasing in 
2011. But looking at the trend over the last five years, no particular break was observed in 2011 (Fig. 
4). The annual increase in total migrant stocks from these was 90,839 in 2011 as compared with 
67,214 in 2010 and 111,738 in 2009. Moreover, 72% of the increase in 2011 is due to migrant flows 
from Morocco alone, a country where street demonstrations remained of limited magnitude and 
resulted in a smooth political shift rather than a revolution. In relative terms, it is the Egyptian 
emigration that has increased the most between 2007 and 2011: by 19% in Germany, 22% in the UK, 
45% in Spain and 58% in Italy (Fig. 4). But it has evenly increased with no particular surge in 2011. 
Philippe Fargues - Christine Fandrich 
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The same applies to all six Arab states. From data available at the time of writing, one can conclude 
that Arab revolts did not produce any change in former trends of legal migration to Europe.  
If Arab revolts did not affect regular emigration to Europe, did they provoke a surge in irregular 
border crossing to Europe? Just after the revolution started in both countries, Tunisia and Libya 
became points of departure for boats smuggling scores of migrants and refugees into Italy. Between 
January and September 2011, 42,807 persons were recorded as entering illegally Italy by sea (most of 
them disembarked in the Island of Lampedusa whose population is only 4,500 people) compared with 
less than 5,000 in 2010 and less than 10,000 in 2009, and an annual average of 18,788 in the preceding 
decade (Table 3). In order to diagnose the situation, three remarks must be made: first, most illegal 
crossings took place in Spring 2011, when police forces were disorganised and coastal control was 
inexistent in Tunisia; second, many non-Tunisians (18,451, i.e. 47% of the total), including more than 
17,000 Sub-Saharan Africans (17,342) were smuggled into Italy together with Tunisians in 2011; and 
third, illegal entries into Italy peaking in 2011 were concomitant with their decrease in Malta and 
Spain to such an extent that, if all three countries are considered together, unauthorised entries 
occurred in larger numbers in 1999, 2006 and 2008 than in 2011 (Fig. 5).  
The above facts suggest that: firstly, part of the 29,685 unauthorised Tunisian migrants recorded at 
entry in Italy in 2011 decided to cross in relation with an opportunity (no border control) more than in 
response to a structural change (the revolution) that was just starting at that time; secondly, irregular 
migrants who would otherwise have taken another route (such as crossing from Senegal, Mauritania or 
Morocco to Spain) took the same opportunity. Revolutions would have, therefore, rerouted existing 
flows of irregular migration more than stimulated new ones.  
While Arab revolts did not produce any significant inflow of new migrants to Europe, neither 
regular nor irregular, apart from a short-lived movement of peopled smuggled from Tunisia in the first 
days of the revolution, events in Libya and in Syria resulted in considerable population displacement. 
In the spring and summer 2011, an estimated 1,128,985 people fled war-torn Libya to Tunisia, Egypt, 
Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan, but also Italy and Malta. They belonged to three categories (Tab. 4). 
The first category was comprised of 422,912 Libyans seeking shelter in a neighbouring African 
country; most of whom are believed to have returned to Libya when the war finished in the autumn 
2011. The second category was comprised of migrant workers from all over the world, particularly 
from Arab and Sub-Saharan neighbours of Libya; they represent a large yet indeterminate part of the 
706,073 foreign-nationals recorded as leaving Libya during the events. The third category is made up 
of de facto refugees, i.e. persons in need of protection who were living and working in Libya but not 
registered as refugees because Libya, not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention, does not recognise 
the status of refugees. These persons had come from Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad and other 
countries in Africa; it is probable that many of them could not return to their homes and found 
themselves stranded in Egypt, Tunisia or Algeria. 
For people fleeing Libya, the travel back home or to a country of asylum was more often than not a 
distressful experience. But, there is no doubt that the most unsafe route was the journey across the 
Mediterranean to Europe. While there are no records of large numbers of people dying while travelling 
in the opposite direction away from Libya across the Sahara, around 1,500 migrants and asylum 
seekers drowned in the Mediterranean on their way from Libya to Europe during the first half of 2011. 
The second refugee crisis triggered by the Arab Spring started in Syria during the summer 2011, 
and took momentum in 2012. At the time of writing, no one could say how it will develop. On June 
7
th
, their number was estimated at 115,117 by UNHCR, all of them hosted by a neighbouring country 
(with the exception of Israel); 72,874 were assisted by UNHCR, and an estimated 42,243 by the 
receiving states, NGOs or local populations. While no refugee movement towards Europe had 
apparently taken place, a communication of the European Commission, Communication on the 
functioning of the Schengen area [Com(2012) 230 Final, 16 May 2012] noted that: “the situation in 
Syria may prompt a future migration flow into the neighbouring countries, and also into the European 
Migration after the Arab Spring 
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Union. In October-December 2011, 578 Syrians were detected while attempting to cross the Schengen 
external land border between the official border crossing points, compared to 210 persons in the same 
quarter of 2010. 82 % of these were detected at the Greek external land border.”5 
Migration Governance in the Northern and Southern Mediterranean Since 2011 
The first reaction of the EU was to regard the unfolding revolutions in the Mediterranean as a unique 
political opportunity, not only for the Arab peoples, but also for the Mediterranean region and for 
Europe’s multifaceted links with these countries. In the backdrop of the revolutions, the EU and 
several Member States rapidly expanded their Mediterranean focus from development to the 
promotion of democracy. Less than two months after Ben Ali fled Tunisia, the European Commission, 
in its communication entitled A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean Countries, offered a ‘more-for-more’ approach linking its financial support to 
democratic reforms. According to this incentive-based approach, “those that go further and faster with 
reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU.”6 At the onset, the EU committed 
significant funding to support democratic transitions.  
One of the strongest proposals, the EU-Tunisia Task Force, was meant to provide 4 billion Euros to 
support democratic transition between 2011 and 2013 (EU-Jordan and EU-Egypt Task Force will be 
created in 2012). The Support for Partnership Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme 
(created in September 2011) also foresees 350 million Euros to support democratic transformation and 
sustainable growth. In Morocco, assistance for development and democratic reforms was increased by 
20% to 580.5 million Euros. Furthermore, the EU budget for the Neighbourhood (South and East) is 
proposed to be massively increased by 40% to 18.1 billion Euros. European States also played an 
important political role at the UN in post-crisis Libya and Syria, and they continue to play a role.  
One of the underlying expectations of this renewed focus on democracy is that, in the long-term, a 
stable Mediterranean leads to less migration and better managed migration. As an incentive for 
countries to democratize, enhanced mobility has been offered to those who reform. Therefore, 
enhanced mobility will be offered for those who democratise which in the end leads to less migration 
and more secure migration. The link between EU democratising policies and migration is found in A 
New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of a European Neighbourhood Policy, which 
stipulates that: “Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in 
building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law…This enhanced support will 
come in various forms, including…greater facilitation of mobility.”7  
Although new emphasis and great effort was dedicated to democracy-building, the EU did not 
invent any new responses to short-term migratory movements or long-term migration. Rather, EU 
policies on migration after the Arab Spring reaffirmed old positions regarding Mediterranean 
migration. Moreover, in reaction to a short-lived movement from Tunisia, some Member States 
questioned the ability of the Schengen Treaty to adequately monitor migration flows into Europe.
8
 The 
EU has been developing these long-standing external dimensions of its migration policies since the 
last decade. The Stockholm Programme in 2009 offered a vision further developed by The Global 
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 European Commission, (2011). A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern mediterranean 
(COM(2011) 200 final). Retrieved from website: http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf 
7
 Ibid.  
8
 Ibid. 
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Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). The GAMMs framework, in which specific policies 
targeting Mediterranean countries takes place, includes four pillars: legal migration and mobility; 
irregular migration and trafficking in human beings; international protection and asylum policy; and 
maximising the development impact of migration and mobility.
9
 This approach to migration was not 
affected by the Arab Spring, and so far, most EU efforts, post-revolutions, have been dedicated to the 
second pillar. 
The Arab Spring raised fears of an exodus of irregular migrants and unwanted migration and these 
fears swiftly resulted in European States placing their efforts on strengthening border control and on 
pressuring readmission agreements. Due to its proximity to the crises in Tunisia and Libya, Italy was 
(in Europe) the most exposed to migratory flows. In order to address the risk of a large number of 
unwanted migrants reaching Italy and the tiny island of Lampedusa, on 20 February 2011, FRONTEX 
Joint Operation Hermes began monitoring the seas of the Mediterranean. In March 2011, the Italian 
interior minister, Roberto Maroni, said that flows of migrants from Libya would bring Italy “to its 
knees.” The Foreign Affairs Minister Franco Frattini talked of 200,000-300,000 arrivals, creating a 
future that was “impossible to imagine.” Frattini warned that the fall of Qaddafi’s regime could lead to 
“an exodus of Biblical proportions”. 10 Likewise, “Muammar Gaddafi warned that if he fell: ‘You will 
have immigration, thousands of people from Libya will invade Europe. There will be no-one to stop 
them any more.’"11  
Without waiting for the creation of an official government, in June 2011, Italy signed a 
Cooperation Accord with the then rebel National Transitional Council, agreeing to share information 
on illegal migration and cooperation on repatriating migrants.
12
 Furthermore, the rebels agreed to 
honour several accords signed between Italy and Gadhafi, including the deportation of irregular 
immigrants without proper status.
13
 The latest development in this constant policy came on 3 April 
2012, when a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on security was signed between the two 
countries to combat the unauthorized departures of migrants from Libya.
14
 The MoU provided Libyan 
police forces with training and technical tools for controlling the border; proposed mechanisms for 
information sharing on irregular migrants and illeagal smuggling networks; and proposed construction 
of a detention centre in Kufra for irregular migrants. Moreover, the MoU stated the urency of 
obtaining necessary support from the European Commission for reopening the detention centre.
15
  
In the same vein, but in a completely different political context, Tunisia and Italy signed a 
Cooperation Accord in April 2011, described by Maroni as: “a bilateral technical cooperation accord 
to counter illegal immigration and to strengthen collaboration between the two countries’ police 
forces; repatriations are also envisaged”.16 The readmission of migrants was also tackled by EU 
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President Barroso during his visit to Tunisia in the same month whereby he proposed extra financial 
assistance (140 million Euros) to the Tunisian authorities for their cooperation on readmission of 
Tunisians and prevention of irregular migration. He claimed that: "Emigration is not the solution to the 
economic challenges of this country. The long-term solution is economic and social development 
based on the talents and energy of the Tunisian people.”17  
It is significant that, originally proposed in 2010, the Visa Information System (VIS), a database 
which allows the exchange of visa data between Member States, launched specifically in the Arab 
countries where the revolutions began, and not elsewhere. “The launch of the Visa Information System 
(VIS) on 11 October 2011 has proved successful in the first region of deployment (Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia).”18 
The causes of the Arab Spring originated not only in the quest for freedom and dignity, but also in 
the demands for greater economic well-being. However, the initial economic outcome of the 
revolution cannot be considered positive. Entire sectors of the economies of countries subjected to 
revolts, in particular Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, have been collapsing, and unemployment and 
underemployment have increased. Migration certainly is not a solution, but it can and could be part of 
the response.  
Unfortunately, the global context is no longer favourable to migration. The preferred destinations 
of Arab migrants (to the West and the Gulf) are facing growing unemployment among their native 
populations and anti-immigration opinions are rising everywhere. In these destinations, however, 
migrants and natives are probably not always competing for the same jobs as labour markets are 
segmented, and perhaps when the crisis subsides, migrants will still be needed to fill certain segments 
of the economy - in particular, in rapidly ageing Europe. Moreover, the experience of Europe shows 
that when barriers are constructed, migrants and employers find a way to circumvent obstructions to 
mobility. Given this reality, and in order to prepare for the future, prescient leaders are needed to 
respond to the changes occurring in the Southern Mediterranean.  
So far, the EUs response has been to narrowly facilitate migration to the EU by increasing slots 
available for university scholarships and exchanges in Erasmus Mundus (increased programme 
funding by 30 million Euros in the 2011-2012 academic years). Four Mobility Partnerships
19
 have also 
been envisaged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring with Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. At the 
time of writing, progress on Mobility Partnerships are at different stages. Although Egypt has already 
declined the offer of a Mobility Partnership, the EU is entertaining the possibility of resuming 
discussion after Egyptian presidential elections. According to the MPC collaborative survey, however, 
Egypt’s rejection of the Mobility Partnership could be because migration, which before the revolution 
was a matter of policy-making with a special Ministry, has since disappeared from the political 
discourse and is no longer regarded a policy priority.  
In October 2011, Dialogues for Mobility Partnerships were also launched in Tunisia and Morocco; 
however, views of what cooperation on migration should be are not entirely shared by both sides of 
the Mediterranean. In January 2012, Tunisia outlined priorities for a Mobility Partnership which 
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differs vastly from that of the EU: job opportunities for Tunisians; recognition of skills/diplomas; 
reforming the Tunisian education system in order to meet the requirements of the EU labour market; 
promoting migrant’s fundamental rights; integration into the receiving society; and visa facilitation 
inclusion of merchants, civil servants, and family members of migrants in Europe. Under the chapter 
of irregular migration, Tunisia also suggests that the EU develop disadvantaged regions in Tunisia and 
assist migrants who voluntarily decide to return from Europe.
20
  
Further demonstrating the contrast between Northern and Southern Mediterranean views, the MPC 
collaborative survey in Morocco found that Migration and Mobility Partnerships are viewed as a 
means for the EU to have readmission agreements with Morocco, with no real will to manage 
economic migration and mobility. A senior official of Hassan II Foundation for Moroccan Expatriates 
stated that: “either Europe seriously addresses the real challenge, which is the economic development 
of Morocco, or it will be flooded by our migrants.”21 Another senior official from Morocco, 
furthermore, questioned readmission agreements within Mobility Partnerships, asking: “Why should a 
country like Morocco, the last stop before ‘the European Eldorado’, take all the responsibility? [...] 
Morocco thinks readmission should be part of overall migration policy.”22 
In regards to migration governance in Arab states before the Arab Spring, emigration and 
maintaining links with citizens abroad were significant economic and political concerns for most 
countries in the Southern Mediterranean. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon all developed 
government ministries and organisations specifically designed to maintain links with their citizens 
abroad, particularly to encourage development of the homeland through remittances.
23
 Political 
participation of citizens abroad, however, was encouraged less so (or not at all) before the Arab Spring 
as many governments were distrustful of the diaspora, especially as many political opponents had 
formed opposition groups abroad.  
Although much of the above existed in the Arab countries before the Arab Spring, certain countries 
developed relationships with their citizens abroad more concretely after the revolutions. In Morocco, a 
national referendum in July 2011 brought about a new constitution which included several articles 
regarding emigration and continuation of diaspora links. In particular, the new constitution: 
encourages the reinforcement of citizens’ contribution to Morocco’s development and strengthening of 
ties between Morocco/receiving county (Article 16); granting full rights of citizenship (right to be 
electors/exercise of the right to vote and of candidature from the countries of residence) (Article 17); 
and encourages participation in the consultative institutions and institutions of good governance 
(Article 18 and 163).
24
  
Likewise, political parties in Tunisia are all in favour of greater political participation for Tunisians 
abroad (the only reservation, by Ennahda, being that Tunisians abroad should not be able to apply for 
                                                     
20
 Memo presented by Ambassador Ridha Farhat in Brussels (2012 March). Les Grands axes en matière d’immigration et 
d’intégration. 
21
 Chattou, Z., & Ait Ben Lmadani, F. (2012). Migrations internationales après le « printemps arabe ». Forthcoming, 
Migration Policy Centre – European University Institute.  
22
 EU readmission agreements: towards a more strategic eu approach that respects human rights? (2012 , March 12). 
European Policy Centre, Retrieved from http://www.epc.eu/prog_details.php?cat_id=6&pub_id=1435&prog_id=6  
23
 Algeria: Consultative Council for the National Community Abroad; Egypt: Ministry of Manpower and Migration; 
Lebanon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Lebanese Expatriates Abroad; Morocco: Council of the Moroccan Community 
Residing Abroad (CCME); Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad; Tunisia: Office of Tunisians Abroad 







Migration after the Arab Spring 
MPC-RR No.2012/09 © 2012 EUI, RSCAS 9 
the State Presidency). As demonstrated by the MPC collaborative survey in Tunisia, furthermore, the 
government has a strong interest in linking with Tunisians abroad and has taken several measures to 
reinforce this connection. Notably, in 2011, and for the first time, Tunisian expatriates were offered 
participation in the parliamentary elections with 18 seats reserved for their representation.
25
 In October 
2011, the government also created a State Secretariat for Tunisian Expatriates. One of its first 
initiatives was to conduct a survey among Tunisian consulates on clandestine migrants, in particular 
those missing or dead during the crossing in order to find those missing, help those who have been 
detained, and to support their families. Likewise, the government is reforming existing institutions 
(Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger) and creating new ones (“Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l’étranger”, 
“Agence de la Migration et du Développement”, “Observatoire National de la Migration”) primarily 
for the sake of development through migration. As development remains a concern, the Tunisian 
government insists on revising migration agreements with European states in order to link actions to 
prevent irregular migration with measures to boost development.
26
 
Although most of the discourse in Egypt has primarily revolved around internal politics ( especially 
as the interim military rulers, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, have become increasingly 
assertive in political affairs) ), many political figures interviewed or mentioned in the MPC 
collaborative survey in Egypt underlined the necessity for Egyptian migration abroad, in particular for 
reconstruction and development of Egypt through migration.
27
  
Libya, on the contrary, a country of immigration as opposed to emigration, historically had an 
open-door policy on the labour market (foreign nationals welcome as workers) but closed door with 
regard to social inclusion. Migrants and refugees in Libya enjoyed few rights and frequent violations 
and denials of basic rights occurred. Although Libyan elections are scheduled for 7 July 2012, the 
interim leaders, the National Transitional Council, have officially mentioned migration policies which 
diverge from the Libyan government’s actions in the past. In its eight-point plan for rebuilding the 
nation, A Vision of a Democratic Libya, the NTC highlighted that: “The interests and rights of foreign 
nationals and companies will be protected. Immigration, residency and citizenship will be managed by 
government institutions, respecting the principles and rights of political asylum and public liberties.”28  
The Syrian government, which has refused so far to relinquish power - through elections or 
otherwise - has also extended certain rights related to migration in the 2012 Constitution. Whereas 
Article 33 of the 1973 Constitution granted that: “A citizen may not be deported from the homeland,” 
Article 38 of the 2012 Constitution extends to Syrian citizens the right to return and recognises the 
right to leave the country: “Every citizen shall have the right to move in or leave the territory of the 
state, unless prevented by a decision from the competent court.”29  
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Tackling Refugee Movements from Libya and Syria: The Role of Europe, Neighbouring 
Arab States and Turkey  
The EUs response to refugee outflows from Libya was, on the one hand, to encourage Member States 
to assist refugees with humanitarian aid and asylum while also, on the other hand, implement 
“measures …to prevent large numbers of irregular migrants, often exploited by unscrupulous criminal 
networks, from arriving in the EU.”30 On the backdrop of mounting civil war in Libya and subsequent 
outflows of migrants and refugees crossing its land borders, the European Commission’s 
Communication on Migration [COM(2011) 248 final] in May 2011, acknowledged that 650,000 
persons had fled Libya, and that the EU had responded to the crisis by repatriating 50,000 third 
country nationals to their countries of origin and providing humanitarian assistance to refugees in 
North Africa in the amount of 80.5 million Euros.
31
 Likewise a year later, the EU would propose a 
Commission Special Measure to reserve 23 million Euros to partly fund Syrian refugees.
32
  
In December 2011, amidst the political changes taking place, the European Commission opened a 
Regional Protection Programme (RPP) in North Africa – specifically, in Egypt, Tunisia (and when 
possible Libya). RPPs are designed to offshore the management of refugee crises outside the borders 
of Europe in proximity to refugees’ countries of origin. Furthermore, “Resettlement of refugees in 
Member States will be essential in order to reinforce the partnership component of programmes.”33 
However, in May 2011, the European Commission tried to convince Member States that: “it is 
important for EU Member States to accept to resettle some of these persons,” regarding refugees from 
the Arab Spring.
34
 Actually, Europe resettled only 700 refugees in 2011. In reflection to this response 
to the refugee crisis, Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, addressed 
Harvard University in April 2012 by stating that: “no European State took any serious initiative to 
provide shelter on its own soil to those in need of international protection…Instead of solidarity 
among Member States, France and Italy quarreled about possible risks for their internal security, with 
France even reinforcing controls at the internal border with Italy. So, instead of reaching out and 
protecting, the EU Member States were inward-looking and security oriented.”35  
As mentioned, much larger numbers of migrants did not pose a direct challenge to Europe, but to 
neighbouring African neighbours of Libya as more than one million people fleeing war in Libya 
crossed into Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Algeria, Sudan, Niger, and Chad. These countries supported 
the bulk of the burden, even though Tunisia and Egypt were destabilised by their own revolutions. In 
response, Tunisia, and to a smaller extent also Egypt, maintained an open door policy, admitting over 
half a million migrants together with over half a million returning nationals. These movements created 
immense humanitarian concerns, yet neighbouring States took actions to deal with the crisis. As seen 
in Tunisia, migrants and refugees were taken care of by the army, and there was massive solidarity of 
the Tunisian population which provided basic needs which were further strengthened by swift and 
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efficient mobilisation of local NGOs that worked to lessen the burden. These countries and their 
citizens made an enormous effort to host those fleeing the violence and to give protection. The IOM 
(funded by the EU 9.9 million Euros) is also strengthening the capacity of Libya to manage migration 
and is providing services to returning Tunisian and Egyptians and other third-country nationals who 
fled Libya after the revolution.
36
 
While most Libyan refugees in Tunisia have now returned to Libya, several thousand Libyans, 
probably close to the former regime, are still in Tunisia. Some sub-Saharan Africans who fled Libya 
into Tunisia also have no prospect for returning to their homes.
37
 
Will the same story repeat itself in Syria, a year after Libya? Neighbouring Jordan, Turkey and 
Lebanon (and to a smaller extent Iraq), have also taken in Syrian refugees fleeing the violence created 
by the revolution and subsequent civil war in Syria. Tens of thousands of Syrians have fled the 
violence, and estimates of actual numbers are most likely underestimated (the MPC collobarative 
survey in Lebanon found that many Syrian refugees do not want to be registered for fear that names 
are transmitted by the Lebanese government to the Syrian government).
38
  
Even though these neighboring Arab States and Turkey face their own unique political and social 
challenges: “They have all maintained an open borders policy for Syrian refugees.”39 Assisting with 
this crisis, UNHCR and other global and local NGOs are working to provide basic needs support and 
essential services; however, services are increasingly limited, especially as the UNs appeal for $84 
million to help Syrian refugees has gone unmet.
40
 Furthermore, access to basic needs and services is 
available unevenly throughout countries of asylum. Other services are only budgeted for a certain 
number of refugees (See Table 5).  
As discovered in the MPC collaborative surveys on Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, Syrian 
refugees are in serious need of housing, and access to health, education and cash, as savings are 
dwindling.
41
 In Lebanon, civil society plays a critical role in providing for Syrian refugees - in 
particular, in the North where a coalition of 28 charity organisations, mostly Islamist, has provided 
assistance to refugees.  
Syrian refugees also experience exile differently depending upon which country they reside. In 
Turkey, refugees are grouped into camps and the Turkish language presents a barrier for native Arabic 
speakers. Although relatives provide support in Lebanon and Jordan, both countries are strained with 
the recent influxes of Iraqi refugees from the US-led invasion as well as previous flows of Palestinian 
refugees. Both Lebanon and Iraq are also facing political instability, and, in Lebanon, part of this 
instability is related to the years of Syrian involvement within the country.  
The MPC collaborative survey in Lebanon found that the Syrian refugee crisis is now starting to 
impact the fragile political balance in Lebanon. The split between the regime and the opposition in 
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Syria is reflected by a crack within the Lebanese government between pro- and anti- Syrian regime. 
The Lebanese government is opposed to setting up camps for the Syrian refugees, because that would 
make them visible and ignite tensions that are in the latent state in Lebanese society, especially as 
Syrian refugees have brought the conflict inside Lebanese borders. In Tripoli in May 2012, the 
presence of Syrian refugees triggered communal clashes between two neighbourhoods, Bab El-
Tebbaneh (which is Sunni and hostile to the Syrian government) and Jabal Mohsen (which is Alawite 
and supports the Syrian government).
42
 
Migration related challenges likely to follow the Arab Spring 
For the last decade, the drivers of migration from the Southern Mediterranean have included: 
unemployment and underemployment, especially of educated youth; wage differentials between the 
North and South; the attractiveness of Europe in regards to gaining skills and education; the desire to 
live within European cultures and lifestyles; and for family reunification. Post-Arab Spring, these 
reasons for migrating have not vanished; they have, perhaps, only intensified due to the increased 
volatility and uncertainty in the region.  
As revolutions begin to subside, for the moment, and as elections are taking place throughout the 
Arab World, it will become necessary for newly emerging governments to consolidate their regimes. 
Forming new governments, given the long histories of tyranny and dictatorship, will be difficult, and 
many leaders in the Arab World (as well as citizens) have little experience with democracy, let alone 
Islamic democracy, whatever this may be defined as. Countries which have recently experienced 
revolts are now left with inexperienced leaders who will be called upon to govern economies, social 
issues, and foreign policy at a nation-state level (all while forming their states’ versions of democracy 
– endeavours which have so far been applauded by the West, yet sometimes undemocratic in their 
implementation). With history as teacher, the past shows that revolutions tend to be followed by years, 
and sometimes decades, of instability. Therefore, the above migratory pressures may increase during 
this time period.  
Instability caused by the Arab Spring has also had a devastating impact on the economies of the 
region. Although Libyan oil production has resumed and as Egypt remains a producer of natural gas, 
other sectors of the economies throughout the North Africa and the Middle East have disintegrated. In 
2010, Egypt’s tourist industry, the pillar of its economy, brought approximately $13.6 billion in 
revenues;
43
 in 2011 the country received only $9 billion, dropping approximately 35 per cent.
44
 Syria 
is currently embroiled in a civil war which has claimed the lives of 12,000 people, and has been placed 
under economic sanctions by Western and Arab governments. Syria’s economy has been affected, and 
the road to recovery appears long. Instability throughout the region, moreover, frightens foreign 
investors who will be needed to help stabilize these economies.  
For the most part, migration has become a non-topic in public debates in the Arab countries - 
regime and state consolidation, and economic and social issues have taken precedence. In this 
environment, migration policy takes a backseat to ‘bread-and-butter’ issues – migration management, 
therefore, becomes secondary. Moreover, as demonstrated by MPC collaborative survey in Morocco, 
current EU attempts at migration management – Mobility Partnerships – are unattractive to Arab 
leaders in their current form, and migration will most likely continue with or without such a 
management tool.  
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Libya, which has been a country of immigration for hundreds of thousands of Tunisians, Egyptians 
and Sub-Saharan Africans (and less so South-East Asians and Eastern Europeans), has been attracting 
migrants again.
45
 However, the situation in the country could produce new outflows if the country 
destabilizes further. Currently, elections have been postponed until 7 July 2012, and the interim 
government faces several complex issues: a vacuum of experienced leaders accustomed to tribal 
loyalties to rule the country; the increased weaponization of tribes and society during the revolution; 
growing terrorist elements throughout the country; and violent tribal disputes which disobey the 
respect of human rights. Due to their own internal conflicts, Libya’s neighbours –Mali, the Horn of 
Africa and Chad – could also produce more refugees creating additional refugee movements in the 
Southern Mediterranean.  
Refugee outflows could also continue, as they have been, if the Syrian government insists on 
perpetrating violence against its citizens. Lebanon and Jordan, and to a lesser extent Turkey, are 
strained with previous refugee flows from Iraq, and Iraq is still recuperating and stabilizing after the 
US-led invasion and subsequent civil war. The refugee situation could become extremely difficult for 
these countries of first asylum, and people may seek safety elsewhere.  
Factoring the Arab Spring in European Migration Policies 
One and a half years after the onset of the uprisings south of the Mediterranean, four facts could help 
reorient migration policies: 1) the Arab Spring presents a monumental opportunity for Europe’s 
neighbourhood to engage in a virtuous circle of human progress - an opportunity European states do 
not want to miss; 2) the Arab Spring and emigration are linked by common determinants, in particular 
intense frustration of young people increasingly educated but at the same time denied agency and 
acceptable futures; 3) migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, but has simply 
continued along previous trends despite the economic crisis in the receiving countries; and 4) the 
events in the Arab World have produced two major refugee crises in Europe’s neighbourhood, and 
mounting violence should be expected to intensify refugee flows.  
Acknowledging these facts, what could more effectual policy-making on migration in the Southern 
Mediterranean be in the future? Firstly, the EU could consider that the same principles apply to 
diplomacy and democracy promotion on the one hand, and to migration management policies on the 
other hand.  
Currently, a tension exists between the EUs heightened focus on democracy promotion and the 
EU’s and EU Member States’ external aspects of migration policy. On the one hand, EU funding for 
countries in the Southern Mediterranean is based on a ‘more-for-more’ approach. The more a country 
democratically reforms, the more support they receive. The EU claims that the European Union and its 
Member States: 
“needs to support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same 
freedoms that we take as our right …This new [‘more-for-more’] approach should be rooted 
unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values. The demand for political participation, 
dignity, freedom and employment opportunities expressed in recent weeks can only be addressed 
through faster and more ambitious political and economic reforms …The commitment to 
democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law must be shared.”
46
 
At the same time, however, the EU and its Member States are also funding Arab governments 
through Arab governments’ implementation of readmission agreements (and, as mentioned, the EU is 
also seeking to engage these newly forming governments in Mobility Partnerships with readmission as 
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a prerequisite) and through implementation of a Regional Protection Programme, regardless of how 
democratic these regimes may seem.  
EU’s and Member States’ external migration policies, which are foremost concerned with 
safeguarding national security, will have to be consistent with efforts to promote stability through 
democracy and development in the Arab region. European States will not wish to repeat the mistakes 
of the past when they were courting undemocratic rulers for the sake of border control. In the past, in 
countries ruled by dictators, funding for border control meant more money for surveillance, ships, and 
guards which were in turn incorporated into the police for control over citizens. Controlling the border 
went hand in hand with the repression of citizens and the deportation of third-country nationals, often 
in violation of human rights.  
The EU and its Member States are keen to make sure that funding for border control is also linked 
to democratic reforms if an “unambiguous commitment” to democracy is to be realized. They have to 
ensure that these policies will not backfire and produce unwanted side-effects. Given that newly 
forming regimes have never experienced managing nation-states, the promotion of democracy could 
become jeopardized if support for border control results in strengthening forces of repression thereby 
fomenting conditions for continued strife.  
Further steps in migration management, in the light of the Arab Spring, could include the 
following:  
 Southern Mediterranean countries should be a stable priority in the Global Approach to 
Migration and the EU neighbourhood policy due not only to their demographic size and 
dynamics, but also to their importance in the political stability of the Mediterranean; 
 Migration profiles which cover the statistical, legal and socio-political of both inwards and 
outwards migration should be developed for the concerned countries and regularly updated; a 
consultative mechanism involving the concerned countries in the drafting process could be 
defined; 
 The EU and its Member States should define mechanisms which ensure that support for border 
control is not diverted for repressing citizens and third-country nationals;  
 Acknowledging that migration works better for the origin countries’ development when 
migrants are well-linked to these countries, the EU and its Member States should facilitate 
the two-way circulation of people –migrants themselves, their business relations, their 
family members—as MPC collaborative surveys show that this is a recurrent claim in the 
Arab countries. 
 In light of the safeguards the Visa Information System (VIS) will provide, the circulation of 
people should be favoured at least for short-term stays of maximum 3 months in the Schengen 
area. As a clear political sign of its willingness to favour mobility in view of the conclusion of 
mobility partnerships, the EU should offer some visa facilitations without linking these to the 
issue of readmission, for instance regarding facilitations that can be implemented within the 
scope of the visa code, in particular the issue of multiple entry visas; 
 The conclusion or the reinforcement of bilateral youth mobility agreements between the EU 
Member States and the concerned third countries should be encouraged; 
 A right of access to the labour market should be given for a limited period of time to students 
coming from the concerned countries, after their completion of education in Europe, in order 
to gain a first professional experience in the EU;  
 Research has shown that the better migrants are integrated in their host society, the more 
efficient they are in contributing to their home society’s development. In the same way, 
political participation granted to long-term migrants at local level in the host country may well 
bring ‘democratic remittances’ to the home country. The EU and its Member States should 
grant political participation for long-term migrants at the local level.  
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 In the framework of the new Regional Protection Programme, the Member States should 
resume and engage more intensely in refugee resettlement as burden-sharing is currently 
insufficient and will become unpersuasive for countries to continue to collaborate with the EU 
if refugee flows continue to rise;  
 The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) should extend an early-warning mechanism of 
refugee crises in the region to support countries of first asylum in the Southern Mediterranean 
in order to anticipate the needs of the concerned countries and persons and to give advice 
about the help that the EU and its Member States can offer to the concerned third countries.  
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Appendix 
Tables  
Table 1. Migrants originating in Arab Mediterranean countries by region of residence - most 
recent data available in 2011 
Country of 
origin 
















Morocco 2,390,174 46,544 19,839 26,279 92,522 2,575,358 8.1% 
Algeria 1,475,662 19,595 4,593 21,850 56,310 1,578,010 4.4% 
Tunisia 516,440 15,985 14,124 11,311 20,308 578,168 5.5% 
Libya 43,646 2,035  6,928 10,947 63,556 1.0% 
Egypt 199,153 1,132,091 164,348 121,082 226,661 1,843,335 2.3% 
Palestine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Jordan 25,745 168,668 2,053 48,990 78,195 323,651 5.2% 
Lebanon 153,196 52,543 966 6,635 296,065 509,405 12.0% 
Syria 109,913 120,524 17,017 91,477 82,482 421,413 2.1% 
Total 4,913,929 1,557,985 222,940 334,552 863,490 7,892,896 4.0% 
Source: national censuses data compiled by A. di Bartolomeo for CARIM - EUI - migrants are defined as "foreign-born" or 
"non nationals" according to countries 
Table 2. Immigration in Arab Mediterranean countries - most recent data available in 2011 
Country 
Immigrant stocks 
Total Regular (1) Irregular (minimum) 
Morocco 72,348 62,348 10,000 
Algeria 105,000 95,000 10,000 
Tunisia 45,192 35,192 10,000 
Libya 1,449,065 449,065 1,000,000 
Egypt 362,500 262,500 100,000 
Palestine na na na 
Jordan 992,273 392,273 600,000 
Lebanon 702,315 302,315 400,000 
Syria 742,218 42,218 700,000 
Total AMC 4,470,911 1,640,911 2,830,000 
n.a.: Not available 
Sources: (1) Non-citizens or born-abroad residents according to most recent official records (census, permits of stay, survey); 
see Fargues, Ph. (ed.) Mediterranean Report 2008-2009, Appendix 7, p. 486. www.carim.org 
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Table 3. Unauthorised arrivals by sea in Italy by country of declared nationality 
Year All countries Arab countries Other countries 
2001 20,143 7,849 12,294 
2002 23,719 9,263 14,456 
2003 14,331 5,096 9,235 
2004 13,635 n.a. n.a. 
2005 22,939 13,960 8,979 
2006 22,016 15,612 6,404 
2007 20,165 n.a. n.a. 
2008 36,951 n.a. n.a. 
2009 9,573 n.a. n.a. 
2010 4,406 2,092 2,314 
Annual average 2001-2010 18,788 8,979 8,947 
2011(*) 42,807 25,465 17,342 
(*) January-September 2011 only - Q4 is missing. 
Source: Ministry of Interior 
Table 4. Persons fleeing Libya during Spring and Summer 2011 
by nationality and country of shelter 
Libyans seeking refuge abroad 1/ 422,912 
Migrants 2/ 706,073 
 Tunisians returning to Tunisia 96,913 
 Egyptians returning to Egypt 140,642 
 
Third country nationals reaching Tunisia or Egypt 292,772 
 
Other migrants reaching an African country bordering Libya 148,281 
 
Migrants and refugees of all nationalities fleeing from Libya to Italy or Malta 27,465 
Total Migrants + Libyans 3/ 1,128,985 
1/ Arrivals of Libyans in Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria as of 08 June 2011 
2/ Movements of non-Libyans as of 30 September 2011 
3/ As of 30.09.2011 for Migrants and 08.06.2011 for Libyans 
Source: IOM 
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Table 5. Services Provided to Syrian Refugees in Countries of Asylum 
*Source: UNHCR Update No. 8 Syria Regional Refugee Response Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey 07 June 201247 
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Jordan  Private homes 
(relatives/rented) 
Transit Facilities  
(Jordanian Gov.) 
 • Protection   
• Shelter  
 
• Food   




• Education  
 Jordan Gov./UNHCR 
 Jordan Gov./UNHCR/Relatives 
or Rented 
 UNHCR/WFP  
 Jordanian MOH/Caritas/Jordan 
Health Aid Society/ International 
Medical Corps 
 
 Jordanian MOE/UNICEF  
Lebanon Private homes 
(relatives/rented) 
 • Protection   
• Shelter   
 
• Food 
   
• Health  
 
• Education 
•Lebanese Gov./UNHCR  
•Norwegian Refugee Council – 
financial support to host families
  
• HRC/Various Islamic 




Iraq Private homes 
(relatives) 
Refugee Camp 
(Domiz Camp in 
Duhok) 
• Protection  
• Shelter  
• Food   
• Health  
 
 Iraq Gov./UNHCR 
 Iraqi MoDM/UNHCR/Relatives 
 Iraqi MoDM/Islamic Kurdistan 
League 
 Iraqi Dept. of Health 
 
Turkey  Refugee Camps 
(Gaziantep, Kilis, 
Hatay and Sanliurfa, 
and Acce) 
• Protection  
• Shelter  
• Food   
• Health 
• • Education 
 
All services provided by the 
Turkish Government and the 
Turkish Red Crescent Society  
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Figures 
 
Source: OECD Database 
 
 
Source: OECD Database 
 
 
Source: National statistical offices of the countries of destination 
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